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Malpractice in Dental Anesthesiology
Allen L. Perry*
C ASES INVOLVING dental anesthesia reveal that breaches of
the duty to use proper skill and care have occurred in
selection of the type of anesthetic, method of administration,
failure to examine the patient, use of unsterile instruments, fail-
ure to use safety devices, and failure to properly care for patients
under the influence of anesthesia.
Persons practicing dental anesthesiology, like those prac-
ing medicine and surgery, must be duly able and careful. This
rule is elementary and is founded on considerations of public
policy.' Whenever the behavior of a dentist or dental anesthe-
siologist has been of a nature such that a dereliction of these
requisites is evinced, an action in malpractice may lie.
Generally, malpractice is regarded as a tort, but the term is
so broad that any professional misconduct arising through ig-
norance, carelessness, want of proper skill, disregard of estab-
lished rules, or criminal intent, is included within the definition. 2
The dentist or anesthesiologist may conduct himself so as to be
'guilty criminally,3 obligated contractually, 4 or liable tortiously.5
* B.S.E.E., Howard University; Research Engineer, NASA Lewis Research
Center, Cleveland; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School
of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Stevenson v. Yates, 183 Ky. 196, 208 S. W. 820 (1919); Summerour v. Lee,
104 Ga. 73, 121 S. E. 2d 80 (1961); Allison v. Blewitt, 348 S. W. 2d 182 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1961); Engle v. Clark, 346 S. W. 2d 13 (Ky. App. 1961); see also,
Ohio Rev. Code, §§ 4715.01-4715.99, which is exemplary of the majority
of the states' codes on this subject.
2 See 2 Encyc. of Negligence, § 418 (1962).
3 Crabb v. Kansas State Board of Dental Examiners, 118 Kan. 513, 235 P.
829 (1925); Batty v. Arizona State Dental Board, 57 Ariz. 239, 112 P. 2d 870
(1941); Richardson v. Simpson, 88 Kan. 684, 129 P. 1128 (1913); McDonald
v. McKnight, 248 Mass. 43, 142 N. E. 825 (1924).
4 Wheaton v. Rubin, 162 Pa. Super. 320, 57 A. 2d 589 (1948); Ebner v.
Mackey, 186 Ill. 297, 57 N. E. 834 (1900); Lake v. Baccus, 59 Ga. App. 656,
2 S. E. 2d 121 (1939); Keating v. Perkins, 250 App. Div. 9, 293 N. Y. S. 197
(1st Dept. 1937); Zinze v. Frasca, 133 N. J. L. 68, 42 A. 2d 373 (1945);
Safian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 260 App. Div. 765, at 768, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 92
(1st Dept. 1940), where the court asserted: "If a doctor makes a contract to
effect a cure and fails to do so, he is liable for breach of contract even
though he uses the highest possible professional skill."
5 Mastro v. Kennedy, 57 Cal. App. 2d 499, 134 P. 2d 865 (1943); Roberts v.
Parker, 121 Cal. App. 264, 8 P. 2d 908 (1932); Barham v. Widing, 210 Cal.
206, 291 P. 173 (1930); Carr v. Dickey, 163 Cal. App. 2d 416, 329 P. 2d 539
(1958); Hurley v. Johnston, 143 Conn. 364, 122 A. 2d 732 (1956); Ribarin v.
Kessler, 78 Ohio App. 289, 70 N. E. 2d 107 (1946); Pollack v. Dussourd, 158
F. 2d 969 (6th Cir. Ohio 1947).
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1964
13 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
Yet each of these is malpractice. It is the general rule, however,
that society will be served by holding a dentist primarily civilly
liable for the consequences of his breaches, without imposing
criminal liability, when he acts with good intentions.6
Liability for injuries resulting from the administration of
anesthetics, general or local, is generally governed by the princi-
ples of negligence; 7 anesthesia in dentistry is no exception.
Normally, the dentist-patient relation is contractual.8 De-
spite the fact that the dentist invites persons to seek his services,
he is under no legal obligation to accept those attracted as his
patients. Regardless of morals or professional ethics, the law
does not require that one be his brother's keeper 9 simply be-
cause he is licensed to practice dentistry.
Only where there has been an acceptance of the invited per-
son as a patient does the law impose duties on the dentist and on
the patient.10 Then the dentist undertakes, either expressly or by
implication, that he possesses ordinary knowledge and skill, and
that he will use ordinary care in the exercise of his skill and
knowledge to accomplish the purpose for which he is employed."
Further, once the relation is established the dentist is obliged
to continue his services until they are no longer needed, or until
he is discharged. 12
6 State v. Schulz, 85 Iowa 628, 8 N. W. 469, 39 Am. Rep. 187 (1881); see also,
42 Ohio Jur. 2d 630, where it is stated: ". . . in any event the action for
malpractice is a civil action, which is the only form of action under the
code."
7 Carnahan, The Dentist And The Law 131 (1955); Wasmuth, Standards of
Care in Anesthesiology, 7 Clev-Mar. L. R. 403 (1958).
8 Webster v. Board of Dental Examiners of California, 17 Cal. 2d 534, 110
P. 2d 992 (1941).
9 Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N. D. 338, 294 N. W. 183; 132 A. L. R. 379 (1940);
Findlay v. Board of Sup'rs of County of Mohave, 72 Ariz. 58, 230 P. 2d 526
(1951).
10 McNamara v. Emmons, 36 Cal. App. 2d 199, 97 P. 2d 503 (1939); Hurley v.
Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N. E. 1058 (1901).
11 Mernin v. Cory, 145 Cal. 573, 79 P. 174 (1904); Vann v. Harden, 187 Va.
555, 47 S. E. 2d 314 (1948); Lewis v. Soconis, 246 App. Div. 762, 283 N. Y. S.
931 (1935); Carnahan, op. cit. supra note 7, at 121; Note, Contractual Li-
ability of Physicians and Surgeons, 1953 Wash. U. L. Q. 413; Louisell and
Williams, Trial of Medical Malpractice Cases 191, 193 (1960); and see gen-
erally, 70 C. J. S., Physicians and Surgeons, §§ 37, 38.
12 Wheaton v. Rubin, supra note 4; Gerken v. Plimpton, 62 App. Div. 35, 70
N. Y. S. 793 (1901); Anno., Liability of Physician Who Abandons Case, 57
A. L. R. 2d 432 (1958).
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It obviously would be unfair to require a dentist to com-
plete effective treatment regardless of the patient's conduct.
13
Accordingly, the patient has the duty to give an honest medical
history, to inform the dentist of unexpected matters occurring
in the course of the treatment, and to make known whether he
clearly understands a contemplated method of procedure. These
duties may be involved in such defenses as contributory negli-
gence14 or assumption of risk; but, even more important, they
may be pertinent in testing the character of the dentist's per-
formance.
When treatment of a patient necessitates use of anesthesia,
the dentist must decide what type (local or general) to ad-
minister.
General anesthesia has some advantages. It provides com-
fort for the patient and facilitates operative procedures, as it
causes complete immobility and assures a painless operation.
Local anesthesia is better for minor oral operations, because
it is less expensive, allows the patient to be ambulatory, and can
be used in poor risk cases for which general anesthesia is con-
tra-indicated.
It should be realized, however, that whatever the type,
anesthesia is a poison, and should be administered with great
care. 15 Consequently, the type of anesthesia selected by the
dentist, or sanctioned by him, should be determined with con-
sideration of the major criterion, the safety of the patient. The
dentist, however, is not a guarantor of favorable results.16 In
the face of injury or even death itself, well founded rules are ap-
plied to differentiate malpractice from the mere fact of such
eventualities. 17 A mainstay among these rules is the necessity of
expert testimony to maintain a suit in malpractice against a
dentist.'3 Experts skilled in the dental profession usually, but
13 Louisell and Williams, op. cit. supra note 11.
14 Chubbs v. Holmes, 111 Conn. 482, 150 A. 516 (1930); see also, Anno.,
Contributory negligence or assumption of risk as a defense in actions against
physicians or surgeons for malpractice, 50 A. L. R. 2d 1043 (1954); Donathan
v. McConnell, 121 Mont. 230, 193 P. 2d 819 (1948).
15 Phillip v. Stillwell, 55 Ariz. 147, 99 P. 2d 104 (1940); McBride v. Roy, 177
Okl. 233, 58 P. 2d 886 (1936); Van Epps v. McKenny, 189 N. Y. S. 910 (Sup.
Ct. Monroe County 1921).
16 Harris v. Wood, 214 Minn. 492, 8 N. W. 2d 818 (1943).
17 Donoho v. Rawleigh, 230 Ky. 11, 18 S. W. 2d 311 (1929); Mastro v. Ken-
nedy, supra note 5.
18 Phillip v. Stillwell, supra note 15; Berardi v. Memicks, 164 N. E. 2d 544
(Mass. 1960).
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not always, are the only witnesses who are qualified to testify
as to whether or not there was negligence in the method of
treatment.19
A typical liability case was Roberts v. Parker.20 There in-
flammation in the gums showed definite symptoms of infection.
Where such conditions are found, it is considered dangerous in
the dental profession to inject an anesthetic into the gum with-
out first taking steps (such as x-ray) to determine the extent of
the infection. When the dentist injected novocain (procaine
hydrochloride) into the patient's inflamed gum, he was liable for
the osteomyelitis that developed in the patient's jawbone.
There are instances in which the propriety of the treatment
may be said to be common knowledge, where the matter is of a
nature that may be evaluated by the ordinary use of the senses
of a non-expert. In such cases expert testimony is unnecessary. 21
Dispensation of expert testimony is found in Barham v. Widing'2
where a patient claimed that a dentist used an unsterile hypo-
dermic needle in administering an anesthetic, and also failed to
treat the infection of the patient's gum which might have been
caused by the unsterile needle. It was stated by the court, in
affirming an award of damages:
Under the circumstances of this cause there is a remote
possibility that the infection developed from some cause
other than the defendant's failure to sterilize the needle or
the gum into which it was inserted, but the evidence is suf-
ficient upon which to warrant the jury in finding that it was
caused by his negligence in failing to show these reasonable
precautions in spite of his testimony to the contrary.
In United Dentists v. Bryan,23 the infection began and cen-
tered where the needle was injected in the gum. This was enough
to make unnecessary expert testimony to show lack of proper
skill and care.
Proof the dentist failed to exercise the proper general
19 Rising v. Veatch, 117 Cal. App. 404, 3 P. 2d 1023 (1931). Contra (no
expert needed): Lipman v. Lustig, 190 N. E. 2d 675 (Mass. Super. 1963).
20 Supra note 5.
21 Benson v. Dean, 232 N. Y. 52, 133 N. E. 125 (1931); and Lipman case,
supra note 19; Burde v. Errickson, 132 N. J. L. 377, 40 A. 2d 573 (1945);
Zettler v. Reich, 256 App. Div. 631, 11 N. Y. S. 2d 85 (1939), affd. 281 N. Y.
729, 23 N. E. 2d 548 (1939); contra, Steinka v. Bell, 32 N. J. Super. 67, 107
A. 2d 825 (1954); Meyer v. Ross, 31 Cal. Rptr. 110 (Cal. App. 1963).
22 Supra note 5, at 177.
23 158 Va. 880, 164 S. E. 554 (1932).
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degree of skill and care is not the end of the plaintiff's case. 24
Thus, in one case a patient's aching tooth was removed in two
parts, one of which showed infection. The dentist, having used
an infiltration (local) type of anesthesia, painted the gum with
iodine, but did not curette (scrape away the morbid matter).
Finally, the patient went to another practitioner, who found
it necessary to remove part of the jawbone and seven teeth. A
judgment for the patient was set aside, because the defendant's
failure to exercise reasonable skill and care in selecting the type
of anesthesia was not shown, through expert testimony, to be the
cause of the patient's injuries.2 5 In order to recover against a
dentist, the plaintiff must produce evidence from which the jury
is justified in finding that the plaintiff's injury was due to the want
of skill and care of the defendant.20 This burden is not met by
showing that the injury might have been the result of two or
more causes, one of which was defendant's unskillful treatment.
27
The patient, however, is not required to exclude every possibility
that the injury might have been caused through some means for
which the dentist is not responsible. 28 It is only necessary that
he prove his case by a preponderance of evidence. 29
A broken hypodermic needle lodged in the patient's gum
seems to present a vivid picture of negligence of the dentist.
3 0
While broken needles are the foci of many legal controversies, the
fact that a needle breaks during the administration of anesthesia
is not proof of negligence in itself.81 Treatment by the dentist fol-
lowing the breaking, and other evidence,32 are pertinent in de-
termining whether he was exercising the proper skill and care.
But it seems clear that failure to remove the broken portion of
24 Matuschka v. Murphy, 173 Wis. 484, 180 N. W. 821 (1921); Perifield v.
Footz, 285 P. 2d 130 (Nev. 1955).
25 Matuschka v. Murphy, Ibid.
26 Donoho v. Rawleigh, supra note 17.
27 Bowles v. Bourbon, 148 Tex. 1, 219 S. W. 2d 779, 13 A. L. R. 2d 1 (1949);
see also, 13 A. L. R. 2d 11 (1950), Anno., Proximate cause in malpractice
cases.
28 United Dentists v. Bryan, supra note 23; Vigneault v. Dr. Hewson Dental
Co., 300 Mass. 223, 15 N. E. 2d 185 (1938); Ley v. Bishop, 88 Cal. App. 313, 263
P. 369 (1928); Dimock v. Miller, 202 Cal. 668, 262 P. 311 (1927); Prosser, Law
of Torts, 222 (2d ed. 1955).
29 Prosser, op. cit. supra, note 28, at 198.
30 Walter v. England, 133 Cal. App. 676, 24 P. 2d 930 (1933).
31 Erneu v. Crofwell, 272 Mass. 172, 172 N. E. 73 (1930); Capolupo v. Willis,
166 Conn. 13, 163 A. 454 (1932).
32 Smith v. McClung, 201 N. C. 648, 161 S. E. 91 (1931); Donoha v. Rawleigh,
supra note 17; Walter v. England, supra note 30.
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a needle, coupled with neglect to inform the patient of its
presence in the gum, raises a question for the jury without the
necessity of corroborating expert testimony.33
An expert competent to testify as to whether there was
proper skill and care exercised in the selection and administra-
tion of general or local anesthesia need not be skilled as a
dentist. 34 This rule, while not limited to general anesthesia, is
applied more frequently to that type, because such anesthesia
is lethal when handled improperly.35 For this same reason, ad-
ministration of general anesthesia without prior examination of
the patient is a negligent act. If injury results in the absence
of the patient's contributory negligence, the dentist is liable.36
Because general anesthesia renders the patient unconscious,
the dentist may be liable for failure to use a throat dam or pack
when performing operations and extractions on such an anes-
thetized patient. Consequences of use and the neglect to use a
prop are illustrated in Bollenbach v. Bloomentha 37 and Eggert
v. Dramburg.38 Part of a broken tooth which shattered while
being extracted entered the trachea and settled in the lungs of
the patients in each of these cases. In the latter no pack was
used, and this omission was adjudged a breach of the implied
promise to exercise proper skill and care. The dentist was liable.
In the former a judgment for the patient was overruled, because
the dentist had used a dam. Involuntary action by the un-
conscious patient caused the dam to slip and become ineffective
in the latter case.
Use of general anesthesia compels the dentist to exercise
precautions not normally necessary when local anesthesia is em-
ployed. While a dentist was administering nitrous oxide, in one
case, the partially unconscious patient grasped a part of the
dentist's body with such intensity that the force necessary to
relieve the grip broke the patient's finger.39 The dentist was held
liable for failing to use wrist straps. The care required of a
33 Barham v. Widing, supra note 5; Bennett v. Fitzgerald, 284 Mass. 535, 188
N. E. 247 (1938); Bates v. Dr. King Co., 191 Mass. 585, 77 N. E. 1154 (1906).
See generally, 53 A. L. R. 2d 152 (1957).
34 Hazelwood v. Adams, 245 N. C. 398, 95 S. E. 2d 917 (1957); Burch v.
Greenwald, 247 App. Div. 471, 286 N. Y. S. 661 (1936).
35 Harris v. Wood, supra note 16.
36 Eggert v. Dramburg, 197 Wis. 153, 221 N. W. 732 (1928).
37 255 Ill. App. 305, reversed 341 Ill. 539, 173 N. E. 670 (1930).
38 Supra note 36.
39 Wolfe v. Feldman, 158 Misc. 656, 286 N. Y. S. 118 (1936).
May, 1964
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol13/iss2/15
DENTAL ANESTHESIA MALPRACTICE
patient after anesthetization is illustrated in Langis v. Danforth.40
Here, the unguarded patient awakened, was released, and while
still under the influence of the gas fell through a second story
window, incurring multiple injuries, for which the dentist was
liable.
An action for wrongful death due to administration of an
anesthetic cannot be maintained simply because the patient
died.4 1 It must be shown that the dentist was negligent in some
aspect of performing his duty to the patient.4 - The failure to
use proper skill and care may be manifested in the dentist's
selection of,43 rather than administration of, the anesthetic.
44
In Sanzari v. Rosenfeld 45 the dentist was held liable in a
wrongful death action because he administered a contra-indicated
anesthetic when he failed to read the manufacturer's enclosed
brochures.
Whenever a dentist procures another to administer anesthe-
sia and the patient is injured as a result of the procured party's
negligence, the dentist may be liable. His liability or non-liability
depends upon whether the party administering the anesthesia
is viewed as an independent contractor or as a servant.
46
Generally, the party administering the anesthesia is a special
anesthetist qualified in his field, and insists upon exercising his
own judgment in choice of anesthetic, and care of the patient
during the operation. If he does so he is deemed an independent
contractor and liable for his own acts. On the other hand,
should the dentist select the anesthetic and generally supervise
the administration and care of the patient, the administering
party is a servant and the dentist is liable for his negligence.47
When legal liability results from the violation of a permis-
sion, or by exceeding the patient's consent, the courts often de-
scribe resulting liability by the term "technical assault." 48
40 Langis v. Danforth (two cases), 308 Mass. 508, 33 N. E. 2d 287 (1941).
41 Spain v. Burch, 169 Mo. App. 94, 154 S. W. 172 (1913); Voss v. Adams,
271 Mich. 203, 259 N. W. 889 (1935); Prosser, op. cit. supra note 28, at 711.
42 Harris v. Wood, supra note 35.
43 Julien v. Barker, 75 Idaho 413, 272 P. 2d 718 (1954).
44 Whetsine v. Moravec, 228 Iowa 352, 291 N. W. 425 (1940).
45 30 N. J. 128, 167 A. 2d 625 (1961).
46 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 28, at 357.
47 Id., at 351.
48 Carnahan, op. cit. supra, note 7, at 148.
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The influence of anesthesia in commission of this tort is ap-
parent. In the early days of dentistry patients were held down
by friends, while the person practicing medicine, often the vil-
lage barber, proceeded with the operation. When the operator
observed a need for extending the operation, he could commu-
nicate with the conscious patent, who could withhold or grant
the permission accordingly. Under these conditions the problems
of a technical assault rarely arose.49
With the development of anesthetics, especially those causing
general unconsciousness, without relaxation of the consent rule
the conscientious practitioner sometimes unwittingly becomes a
tortfeasor in an effort to aid the unconscious patient.50 How
liability may be incurred for failing to awaken the patient and
obtain his consent before going further with an operation as il-
lustrated in Ober v. Hollinger.51 Here the dentist extended the
operation to the extraction of a tooth because he observed
necrosis in the patient's jawbone. The patient sued, and was
awarded judgment for technical assault. There was no room for
discretion on the part of the dentist where the extension was
not necessary for preservation of life or for other emergency.
Wide variations are observed in what will constitute ade-
quate pleadings for an action based on technical assault. The
conflict is illustrated by the cases of Preston v. Hubbell52 and
Ober v. Hollinger.5 3 In the former the dentist extended an op-
eration under general anesthesia in order to repair a fracture,
without incurring legal liability. In the latter the dentist ex-
tended an operation in order to contain a disease, and was held
liable.
Clearly, the law as to dental anesthesiology, as far as mal-
practice is concerned, is in a state of uncertainty.
49 Id., at 149.
50 Estrada v. Williams, 75 Cal. App. 2d 54, 170 P. 2d 43 (1946); Moscicki v.
Shor, 107 Pa. 192, 163 A. 341 (1932); Francis v. Brook, 24 Ohio App. 136,
156 N. E. 609 (1924); Louisell and Williams, op. cit. supra note 11, at 223.
51 14 Ohio L. Abs. 514, 56 A. L. R. 2d 714 (1957).
52 Preston v. Hubbell, 87 Cal. App. 2d 53, 196 P. 2d 113 (1948).
53 Supra note 51.
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